Features
Twelve cryptographic seals,
executed before you put the phone down.
The complete pipeline detailed step by step — what each operation guarantees, the standards it conforms to, and what to cite in an expert report.
For each step we list: what the app does, which reference standard applies, which artefact lands in the bundle.
NTP sync
Authoritative time fix from time.cloudflare.com
Capture
Native camera, raw frame, no filters applied
Location cross-checks
Since version 1.0.84. Beyond GPS: OS simulated-location flag, network position, mobile cells, Wi-Fi networks, GNSS receiver state (Android) · connected Wi-Fi and mobile network (iOS) · device integrity via Play Integrity / App Attest, verified by the server
Watermark
3-line burn-in: time · UUID · GPS+heading
EXIF inject
Camera metadata preserved + LOCUS UserComment
Triple hash
MD5 · SHA-256 · SHA-512 in one pass
RFC 3161 TSA
Sectigo (→DigiCert→GlobalSign) on the media + qualified InfoCert eIDAS on the package
Ed25519 manifest
Device-bound keypair, manifest signed (cross-checks included)
CASE / UCO
JSON-LD sidecar: Image · Device · Location · Provenance
PDF report
Forensic report ready for the case file
BagIt assembly
RFC 8493 packaging + qualified timestamp on the manifest
Registry + e-mail
Only metadata + fingerprints on the server (never the media), certified e-mail notification
Trust model
Three concentric layers that reinforce each other
Reliability does not rest on a single mechanism. Logical chain: file bytes → hash in the manifest → manifest digest in the qualified timestamp → signature of InfoCert, an eIDAS qualified authority. In packages made before 1.0.77 the timestamp is on the tag manifest.
1
Content hash (fixity)
Every file has a SHA-256 digest recorded in the manifests: changing a single byte makes verification fail.
2
Digital signature (authenticity)
The LOCUS manifest — gathering hashes and metadata — is signed with the device's Ed25519 private key.
3
Timestamp (trusted time)
Three RFC 3161 timestamps: a public TSA (Sectigo) binds the media and the signed manifest to a date and time, InfoCert — eIDAS-qualified — the list of fingerprints of all the content.
The final seal. The tagmanifest-sha256.txt file holds the hashes of every control file (including the CASE/UCO sidecar); a timestamp is applied to it, « sealing » the whole bundle: any later alteration becomes detectable and provably subsequent to the certified date.
Bundle structure
A self-verifiable BagIt v1.0 folder
The root and the manifest are common to all types; the payload (data/) changes according to the captured media.
LOCUS-<Tipo>-<uuid>/ ├─ bagit.txt BagIt format declaration ├─ bag-info.txt package metadata (incl. Conformance) ├─ manifest-sha256.txt SHA-256 hashes of files in data/ ├─ tagmanifest-sha256.txt SHA-256 hashes of control files ├─ manifest-sha256.txt.tsr qualified eIDAS InfoCert timestamp (the seal) ├─ tsa-ca.pem TSA CA chain (for verification) ├─ README.txt verification instructions ├─ verify.sh / verify.bat verification scripts (macOS/Linux and Windows) ├─ data/ PAYLOAD — depends on type └─ metadata/evidence.case.jsonld CASE/UCO chain of custody
| Payload file | Photo | Video | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|
| media.jpg / .mp4 / .wav | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| original.jpg | ✓ | — | — |
| manifest.json | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| media.*.sectigo.tsr · manifest.json.sectigo.tsr | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| device.json | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| camera.json / camera.jsonl | ✓ | ✓ | — |
| gps.jsonl | — | ✓ | ✓ |
| mappa-gps.png | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| commento.m4a | ✓ | — | — |
| waveform.png | — | — | ✓ |
| frames/ + frames-strip.jpg | — | ✓ | — |
| histogram.png | ✓ | — | — |
| frames-hist/*.png | — | ✓ | — |
| report.pdf · interactive.html | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| in-media provenance | APP11 | BMFF | — |
The authority is in the timestamp's name: .sectigo, or .digicert or .globalsign if Sectigo does not answer. Packages made before 1.0.77: data/tsa.tsr on the media and tagmanifest-sha256.txt.tsr instead of manifest-sha256.txt.tsr.
Authenticity and fidelity
In-media provenance and signed disclosure
LOCUS separates two questions: « does this file come from this acquisition? » and « how faithful is the content to what was captured? ». It covers both, honestly stating the limits.
LOCUS-PROV-v1 provenance. Beyond the package seal, LOCUS embeds a provenance statement in the file itself, so authenticity travels with the media: an APP11/JUMBF segment for JPEG (ISO/IEC 19566-5), a BMFF uuid box for MP4 (ISO/IEC 14496-12); WAV audio carries no embedded provenance by the nature of the format. It is a manifest inspired by C2PA/JUMBF but not standard C2PA: it uses a proprietary label and is not automatically recognised by c2patool.
Declared fidelity. The capture pipeline is declared in the capture object of the signed manifest: origin (live capture, no import on iOS), the device's computational processing (HDR/multi-frame fusion, which cannot be disabled and is declared honestly, without passing the photo off as raw sensor data) and generative AI editing (ai_editing = none-by-LOCUS). The pipeline declaration is itself intact and non-repudiable.
Location cross-checks (since version 1.0.84). A GPS coordinate alone can be faked. At the very moment of capture LOCUS records sources that do not depend on GPS and that a forger would have to alter all at once: the OS simulated-location flag, the network position (cells + Wi-Fi), the mobile network cells — the only data a third party, the carrier, can confirm from its records —, the Wi-Fi networks, the GNSS receiver state and GNSS time compared with NTP; plus the device integrity attested by Google Play Integrity or Apple App Attest and verified by our server. All of it goes into the signed manifest (location_corroboration), the PDF and the public verification page. Only what was actually read appears: on iPhone Apple does not expose cells to apps, and the bag says so by their absence, not with a boilerplate sentence.
| Aspect | Audio | Photo | Video |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capture | Lossless PCM (WAV) | Computational JPEG | System-recorded stream |
| Computational processing | None | System, not controllable | System |
| Raw sensor data | — | No | No |
| Generative AI editing | None | None | None |
| Fidelity of the authoritative | Not re-encoded | Pre-watermark original kept | media.mp4 not re-encoded |
| Capture API | AVAudioRecorder | UIImagePickerController | AVCaptureMovieFileOutput |
§ 04 · Compliance
Standards baked in.
Not bolted on afterwards.
Conformity references — not certification logos — that govern the bundle structure.
| Reference | Scope | Where in LOCUS |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27037:2012 | Identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence | Full pipeline |
| SWGDE 18-F-002 · 17-V-002 · 23-I-001 | Digital-evidence acquisition · forensic video/audio · imaging best practices | Capture flow, chain of custody |
| RFC 3161 | Time-Stamp Protocol with authoritative trusted authority | Media, manifest.json, manifest-sha256 |
| Provenance LOCUS-PROV-v1 | Content provenance, inspired by C2PA/JUMBF (NOT standard C2PA) | APP11 (JPEG) · BMFF uuid box (MP4) |
| CASE 1.3 / UCO 1.4 | Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression | JSON-LD sidecar |
| BagIt RFC 8493 v1.0 | Hierarchical filesystem packaging for transfer | Bundle root |
| EXIF 2.32 | Exchangeable image file format | Preserved unaltered in JPEG |
| eIDAS 910/2014 | Qualified electronic time-stamps (legal value in EU) | InfoCert TSA on the package manifest, included |
| Play Integrity · App Attest | App and device integrity attestation (Google / Apple), verified by the LOCUS server — since version 1.0.84 | Signed manifest, <span class="mono">location_corroboration</span> entry |