Trusted date
A photo's date is not your phone's date
A smartphone clock is set by whoever holds the phone. How to obtain a date that stands up: RFC 3161 timestamps, NTP synchronisation and qualified eIDAS timestamps.

Of all the challenges a photograph can face, backdating is the most common and the easiest. It requires no expert analysis: it requires pointing out that the date is written by your phone, and your phone is controlled by you.
The problem in one line
Every photograph carries a capture instant, read from the device system clock. And the system clock is an editable setting: three taps take the phone to any date, you shoot, then restore the current time. The resulting file is indistinguishable from one genuinely taken on that date.
A date you gave yourself is not a fact — it is your own statement. Evidential weight begins where the information comes from someone else.
Three levels of «date», not to be confused
The local clock
The time you see on the phone. Useful to you, worthless towards third parties, for the reason above.
NTP synchronisation
The Network Time Protocol lets a device ask public servers for the exact time (LOCUS queries time.cloudflare.com, time.google.com and pool.ntp.org in a fallback cascade). It is not a certification — it is a measurement. The value lies in LOCUS recording both the NTP time and the local clock offset: if the phone was four minutes behind, the manifest says so. That is transparency, not proof.
The RFC 3161 timestamp
Here everything changes. The device computes the file fingerprint and sends only that to a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA). The TSA returns a signed token stating, in essence: «at this time, I saw this fingerprint».
Two practical consequences, both important:
- Confidentiality is preserved. The TSA receives a string, not an image. It does not know what you photographed, and could not say even if it wanted to.
- A timestamp proves anteriority, not content. It says the file already existed. It does not say it depicts the truth. That is a real limit, worth knowing rather than hiding.
Ordinary versus qualified timestamps
Not all timestamps are equal, and the distinction matters.
An ordinary RFC 3161 timestamp — such as those issued by public authorities like Sectigo, DigiCert or GlobalSign — is technically sound and verifiable by anyone using the issuer's public CA. That is what LOCUS applies by default, querying several authorities across different jurisdictions.
A qualified electronic timestamp under eIDAS Regulation (EU) 910/2014, issued by a qualified trust service provider (QTSP), is a different matter legally: Article 41 grants it a presumption of the accuracy of the date and time it indicates and of the integrity of the data it is bound to. In practice the burden shifts: you do not have to prove the date is right — the challenger has to prove it is not. In LOCUS, from app version 1.0.77, every acquisition receives one at no extra cost: an Italian QTSP (InfoCert) applies it to the list of fingerprints of the package's files.
Beware a common imprecision: «accredited» is not a synonym for «qualified». A reliable public TSA is not automatically an eIDAS QTSP. If you need the Article 41 presumption, you need a qualified timestamp.
Why LOCUS timestamps more than once
Each acquisition receives three distinct timestamps. The first on the media: it fixes the photo, video or audio in time. The second on the signed manifest that describes the acquisition. The third, eIDAS-qualified (InfoCert), on the list of fingerprints of every content file: it fixes the whole sealed content in time, not just the media. Packages produced before app version 1.0.77 carry two: on the media and on the inventory of supporting files.
The difference shows when someone tries to rework the package: adding a file, swapping a supporting document, removing an inconvenient attachment. With only the media timestamp, those manipulations would leave no trace. With the timestamp on the list of fingerprints they do, and they are immediately visible.
How to verify it
An RFC 3161 timestamp is verified with OpenSSL, a standard tool with nothing to do with us:
openssl ts -verify -data data/media.jpg -in data/media.jpg.sectigo.tsr -CAfile tsa-ca.pem
openssl ts -verify -data manifest-sha256.txt -in manifest-sha256.txt.tsr -CAfile tsa-ca.pem
The first timestamp's name carries the authority that issued it: sectigo, or digicert or globalsign if Sectigo did not answer. In packages made before version 1.0.77 the media timestamp is called data/tsa.tsr.
A LOCUS bundle ships the issuing authorities' certificates (tsa-ca.pem), so verification works with no connection at all. That is the whole point: whoever checks should depend neither on our site nor on our software. One known caveat on macOS: the system OpenSSL is actually LibreSSL, which answers Verification: FAILED on these timestamps — you need OpenSSL 3 (brew install openssl@3).
The limit to keep in mind
Timestamping answers «when?» and answers it well. It does not answer «is it true?». It certifies that a given fingerprint existed at a given instant; whether the corresponding image faithfully depicts reality is a separate question, resting on context and on the operator.
Note too that timestamping requires connectivity: without a network the TSA cannot be queried, which is why LOCUS does not allow offline acquisition. Verification, by contrast, works perfectly on an air-gapped machine.
Continue with what it takes for a photo to hold up, or see how to validate a bundle step by step.